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It is always necessary in dealing
with the Dialectical Theology, or the
Theology of Crisis, to remember that
the moyemeut is an amorphous thing.
It emerged during the period imme
diately following the first World War;
its thought underwent considerable
change on the Continent in the post
war period, and experienced a radical
transformation as it grew as a trans
planted moyemeut in the United
States.
It is agreed that this type of theol
ogy sprang, in large part, from the
thought and writings of Soeren Kierke
gaard. The Crisis Theologians haye re-
yived and given a theological interpre
tation to his writings, feeling that they
accurately diagnose the case of 20th
century Europe. Just as the thought
of Kierkegaard refused to be chan
nelled, so also the Dialectical Theology
has assumed several shapes, character
istic among which is that issuing from
its pessimistic European form as it
has been transmuted in America into a
jiassion for social reform.
Barth furnishes in the Preface to
his second edition of The EvistJe to the
Romans what may be considered a
common denominator for the Crisis
Theology.
... if I have a system, it is hmited to a rec
ognition of what Kierkegaard calls the 'in
finite qualitative distinction' between time
and eternity, and to my regarding this as pos
sessing negative as well as positive signif
icance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on
earth*. The relation between such a God and
such a man, and the relation between such a
man and such a God, is for me the theme of
the Bible and the essence of philosophy.^
The Dialectical Theology is likewise
deeply indebted to the Existential
School in philosophy, which is a deriv
ative of the tradition of Kierkegaard,
in which Heidegger and others modi
fied the great Dane's individualism by
an emphasis upon man's total existen
tial situation as he is associated with
nature, things, animals, and his fellow
nien.2 The social interest which char
acterized most of the thinkers of the
movement under consideration is prob
ably a derivative of the Existential
School. Barth has, however, reacted
against some of the tendencies in the
thought of Heidegger which seem to
the latter to minimize the sense of
tragedy which the life situation seems
to lay upon the thoughtful man. It is
not i)ertinent to the proposition of this
paper to further develop the system of
the Dialectical Theologians, but rather
to inquire how this system, particular
ly as it is embraced in the United
States does logically, as well as prac
tically, bear u])on contemporary theory
of education. It is necessary once
more to state the caveat issued earlier
�that the Crisis Theology is a mercur
ial thing, difficult to pick up in the
hand; and hence conclusions concern
ing it must be drawn with care.
It is the aim of this article to
seek to discover the manner in which
the Dialectical Theology constitutes a
challenge to present-day theorv of edu
cation, from the standpoint (1) of its
metaphj^sics ; (2) of its anthropology;
and (3) of its ethics.
I
In general, the thinkers under con
sideration (especially Karl Barth, H.
Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr. Paul
Tillich, Edward Geismar, and AVillielm
Pauck) tend to discount philosophy,
at least insofar as it attempts to fur
nish answers to ultimate Questions. To
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the question, "Is a pliilosopliy of reli
gion, strictly speaking, possible?'* the
ansv.er of these men \vould generally
l e in the negative. Yet the ^^ystem
does make certain generalizations con
cerning the nature of the uniyerse.
The "first and most imuortant of
ihese is that the universe embodies cer
tain radical and enduring contradic
tions. The enduring antitheses which
are held to run throughout the theo
logical situation, namelv the 'infinite
qi'ialitatiye distinction' between eter
nity and time, and between God and
mail�these have definite metanhysical
overtones. AYhile modern thought has
attempted to understand eternity in
terms of time, and God in terms of
man, these thinkers deuv that the
re-
lationshi})s existing in the case of
these two pairs can properly be de
scribed in terms of either continuity
or contiguity. This necessarily in
volves things as they essentially are,
and indicates that the system in ques
tion has a metaphysics, which is char
acterized by Earth's disjunctive con
ceptions. . .
The anti-intellectual strain in the
Crisis Theology may be traced to two
factors: the reaction of Barth against
the scholastic method of Heidegger;
and the reaction of Kierkegaard (the
intellectual forbear of both Heidegger
and Barth) to the facile rationalism
of He'^el It must not be sunoosed,
however, that the dialectical Theology
Avas whollv an inherited thing. It
orew up, rather, out of situations
sim-
Fiar to that from which Kierkegaard's
thought came. Even the melancholy
Dane felt in his environment the el
ement of contradiction which seems to
be inherent in all of human existence.
Karl Barth, like Kierkegaard, saw
Avithin the historical situation (as well
as within himself) that which forbid
the completion of the rationalistic tri
angle in Hegelian fashion. Instead
of
an optimistic and triumnhant syn-
ihe^i< he found the universe to lustifv
only a frame of mind which must ^ston
.hort and content itself with the whole
ness which is divined but not Dorceivcd
in a balanced pair of opposites.""-'
Perhaps enough has Iteen said to in
dicate the nature of the meta])liysics
of the system under ciuestion. The con
tradictions in which human experience
finds itself constantly involved are d(>-
rived from the nature of our world.
The universe is rent Oi)en; . . nature
itself is disturbed and thrown into con
fusion by that which is unnatural, by
the contradiction which comes from
the mind and si)irit of men.'"^ The im
plications of this last quotation for
theology need not detain us here;
Brunner is reacting against the facile
monistic view of the universe, both in
resi)ect to its development and to its
present nature.
The emphasis of the thinkers under
study is, however, not i)rimarily u])on
the universe itself, but upon the uni
verse quti understood by man. It is at
this point that its imj)act is exerted
upon modern education. First and
most obvious of the effects of such a
system would be its caution against
dogmatic finality in the study of the
sciences, and particularly of the sci
ence of man. The crisis theologians
themselves incline to accept the devel
opmental vie^y of man ; at the same
time they allow that we today know
far less about man than our predeces
sors thought they knew.
The dualism of the movement, de
rived from the Barthian insistence
upon the radical disconnection be
tween the supernatural and the natural
thus serves to caution modern educa
tion against assuming that the uni
verse is a neat ])ackage, waiting to be
untied, and to reveal to the casual stu
dent its inner secrets.
The situation of man is held to be,
not an epiphenomenon. but a genuine
index to the real nature of the world.
It must be borne in mind that onlv
v6ry recently is America coming to ap
proximate the European scene. But
now emotional strains are appearing;
we are at the threshold of learning
the meaning of suffering. Our predic-
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anient is bringing into acute form the
realization that sometliins: is radically
wrong. The universe, so recently ap
pearing willing to eat out of our hands
(being rapidly subjected to scientific
control ) suddenly eludes our grasp.
The concept of necessary progress, as
a jiiinciple underlying the universe,
seems no longer capable of defense.
Instead of gaily riding the crest of the
"w ave of the future," we find that we
may not, after all, live in that kind of
a world.
i{lducational theory is not escaping
the impact of this realization, which
was seen more or less clearlv a decade
ago by the crisis theologians. They
felt that they could read the trend of
things, from the clue which the uni
verse revealed, �that of radical and
enduring disjunction written deep into
the nature of things. We seem to have
misread our world; if so, we are no
nioi e blameworthy than our educators,
who have followed Condorcet, Comte
and Spencer in believing that man, af
ter reviewing his past, would in time
"remove all inequalities and perfect
human nature."
The perfectibility of human nature,
and belief in necessary and continued
progress, have been twin dogmas, with
clear metaphysical bases. Since 1900,
these concepts have shaped education
al theory ; only recently have they been
(|uestioned. The dialectical theologians
have served as gad-flies, stinging the
educational world awake bv nuestion-
ing these assumptions. They have
pointed out that change is not equal to
progress, and that material develop
ment may be a false barometer of gen
uine and substantial human advance
ment.^
It must not be supposed that the
thinkers in question are social cor
oners or that they categorically deny
the possibility of progress. They ac
knowledge thankfully the sociological
and legal gains that have been
achieved, such as the generally-accept
ed ^'freedoms," the equality of oppor
tunity, and the increased measure of
social and economic security arail-
able under democratic societr. They
protest, however, any view of life
which makes temporal progress an ul
timate, or which insists that the uni
verse is so geared that progress is in
evitable.
Thus, they challenge educators to
question their goals, and to examine
that which they considered worthy of
whole-hearted pursuit. In protest
against a mere science-ism, thev insist
that the universe must be understood
in terms of a hidden dimension, Go4
as transcendent-immanerit. The appli
cation of such a view challenges the
naturalism and the anthropocentri?
character of modern education, im
pleading it to search whether it may
not have, after all, erred in assuming
with Rousseau that nature and human
nature are essentially good, and "that
the first movements of nature are al
ways right." For if these latter sen
timents be true, then education with
out reference to a Deity is to be pre
ferred, since things are not to be
judged in terms of Him anvwav. The
attempt to interpret all of reality in
theistic terms cannot but clash with
such an educational theory as that of
Dewey, who denies the existence of
transcendental categories by reference
to which things are to be understood,
and who finds all of the canons of
understanding to emerge from the on
going of all organic activities.^
This does not mean that the crisis
theologians deny that historical and
cultural relativisms exist ; it does mean
that in this type of thought they are
not considered to be ultimate�that
they are transcended in the categories
of God and eternity, and that the
maximum of possible human compre
hension of these relativisms comes bv
viewing them "from above," that is,
viewing them from the point of view
"of a God who transcends, vet is im
manent in the historical process.
From the foregoing it appears that
the Crisis Theology is more effective,
through its metaphysical assumptions,
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to ex})Ose the presuppositions of mod
ern educational theory, than to offer a
clearly-defined solution. It is fairly
clear at present that they have pointed
the \yay to a diagnosis -of our ills, and
that they are correct in supposing that
our educational system must bear its
fair share of responsibility for the fact
that our age has lost its way. Whether
the proposed metaphysics of the sys
tem is justifiable, and whether it has to
date been sufliciently well defined to
render it workable is a separate ques
tion.
II.
� Starting ostensibly as a new depart
ure in theology, the Theology of Crisis
became rapidly metamorphosed into
an anthropology. This may perhaps
have eome through its genesis, under
circumstances of disillusionment and
despair in Europe, and in the fine fore
sight which some of its thinkers exer
cised in America, even in the rosy days
of the late 'twenties.'^ It must be said
in favor of such men as Reinhold Nie
buhr that they were quick to detect
moral unsoundness beneath surface-
prosperity. It is further to their cred
it, that whereas today thev might sit
back in triumphant detachment, and
say "we told you so," yet they do not
do^ so, but are inclined to share the
responsibility for a world aflame.
But to return to the subject in hand,
after this brief parenthesis: it cannot
be denied that with its ostensible em-
])hasis upon God and upon eternity,
the Crisis Theology never allows the
hunmn problem to move out of sight.
Though it proposes to correct the Hu
manism of this century, it does not
seek to do so by devoting little atten
tion to the human problem. Rather, it
endeavors to vie^y man "from above,"
and to understand him in terms of
Godi not the contrary.
One of the basic protests leveled by
the dialectical theologians against
modern education is that its theory- is
oriented in humanism�a humanism of
an especially vicious type. As a result
of the emergence, in the nineteenth
century, of the science of sociology.
modern education has pursued paths
which have led to the loss of the indi
vidual. Such a statement presupposes
a definition of the term 'individual' in
terms other than that of numerical dis
tinctness. In naturalistic theories, the
individual is lost in the emphasis upon
the interpretations of consciousness,
and in which philosophical approaches
to self-consciousness are lost in natur
alistic explanations.^
In idealism, proper individuality is
lost, not in a failure to iierceive the
depths of the dimensions of the human
spirit, but in the identification of "the
self-transcendent ego with universal
spirit.^'' Thus, whatever the rational
universal, whether the Absolute jMind.
or the State, a proper view of the self
is lost. In Romanticism, the individual
is held to fare no better; for in this
attempt at the championing of the
rights of the self, the self is in reality
either subordinated to the collective
group through his relations to the
realm of nature or else he becomes
himself a god, with no law save his
own will-to-power.
The thinkers under study would
save the individual-self from his fate
in modern thought (whatever direc
tion this may have taken since the Ren
aissance) by appealing to him, in the
name of Christianity, as an isolated
individual. Whatever mav be the so
cial ideology of such men as Brunner
and Niebuhr, they regard a proper
view of the individual unit as basic to
a free society. At this point, the move
ment challenges modem education at
the point of naturalism. Bv interpret
ing the goal of life in terms of adap
tation to biological and other existing
conditions, education trains men for
the life-in-the-hand�for a utilitarian
civilization.
Curiously enough, the same writers
challenge some of the individualistic
assumptions of the modem theory of
education. While some educators crit
icize American thinking (and indirect
ly American education) for its lack of
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a keen social consciousness by reason
of the indiyidualism that is natural to
most of our people, Niebuhr criticizes
our educational theory for its oyer-
indiyidualism.^i The solution to the
human problem is sought through the
increase of man's individual ability.
Thus, viewed in one way, modern edu
cation is still "bourgeois" � it still
thinks in terms of lais.scz faire. Such
a program develops self-assertion with
out any compensatory preparation for
living in the social group. The conse
quent transcendence of his ohysical
and natural limitations renders him
arrogant in the belief that he is "cap
tain of his soul"�with the tendency
toward the intensification of the hu
man social problem, due to the increase
of his power over his fellows.
It is no longer possible to postpone
the question of reconciling these two
apparently contradictory protests : the
one objection that modern education
has tended to lose the individual in the
social group; and the second, that the
role of individual has been falsely ex
aggerated in modern education. The
difficulty is resolved when we note
that what the crisis theologians are
protesting is the inadeauacv of the
modern educators' view of the individ
ual. It has been said isuvra) that
individuality is more than mere nu
merical distinctness : it lies in the fact,
stated by Brunner thus:
Man has been created in and for the v/ord of
God, and this makes him the beine who is re
sponsible. This fact unmistakablv determines
man as an individual. Resnonsibilitv is that
which sets the individual as individual anart
and makes him independent. ... To the ex
tent in which the Christian faith intensifies
the content and the value of resnonsibilitv, as
compared with the ordinarv idea of responsi
bility, the content and the value of individual
existence is also intensified. 12
Thus, this thinker sees in the "mod
ern'' view of individuality a lack of
dimension. Man is viewed within a
merely humanistic frame of refer
ence, and without regard to his ac
countability to a transcendent Creator,
to Whose freedom he is subordinate.^^
Insofar as modern education has lost
its emphasis upon a Christian view of
individuality, and its "What is man
that thou art mindful of him?" it has
no adequate basis for a philosophy of
education which shall train men to
function in a democratic societv as one
who adjusts his rights to the rights
and needs of others. This problem will
appear again in the next section of this
article dealing with the criticism which
these thinkers level at modern educa
tional theory upon the basis of the
ethical presuppositions of the Dialec
tical Theology.
The next important objection which
these thinkers raise to modem educa
tion is its assumption that the solution
to the human problem can be found in
the development of intelligence. Nie
buhr feels that educators are still un
duly under the spell of the Socratic
dictum that "Virtue is knowledge, and
can be taught," and that, beginning
Avith the Renaissance, modernity has
been mistaken in imagining that man
is to be conceived primarily in terms
of the uniqueness of his rational facul
ties. Thus, educators seek fand ex
pect) the solution of men's ills in the
improvement of his rational faculties.
The distrust of reason which char
acterizes the Crisis Theology has been
feared by many who "saw red" before
they seriously considered the writers'
meanings. It is impossible to escape
the impression that Reinhold Niebuhr
has at times been condemned without
fair trial. What he seems to mean is
this: Education can, by cultivating
reason, solve many problems. But
man is a finite creature, and hence in
capable of taking in "the needs of oth
ers as vividly as he recognizes his own,
or to be as quick in his aid to remote
as to immediately revealed necessities."
Thus, reason is limited by the range of
man's possible perspective, and, as
well, by its ability to set for conduct
"goals more inclusive, and socially
more acceptable, than those which
natural impulse prompts."^^
Education, then, fails to take due ac-
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count of tlie factor of fiuiteness in its
cnltivation of reason�either finite-
ness in respect to its temporal and spa
tial perspectives, or in respect to ac-
tnalizing the goals Avhich it discerns,
"nor even of adequately defining, the
unconditioned good which it dimly ap
prehends as the bound and goal of all
its contingent yalues.''^^
In all this, modern education has not
only failed to recognize the limitations
of the culture of reason and the en
largement of intelligence; it has like
wise failed to render reason the master
of impulse. Rather, it frequentlv be
comes, through some types of ])sychol-
ogy (which shape to a large extent
modein education), an instrument
which justifies the actions of unre
strained impulse, and to open avenues
for its ungoverned activity. Such a
challenge would be directed with most
point toward the psychology of Freud,
in which reason is reduced to a place
second to impulse.
Thought and reason are anything but dom
inant forces in man's nature; they exist only
to serve the great primal urges and desires
that are the real masters of human conduct.
The intellect is their servant, and a corrupt
ible servant, not above twistins and conceal
ing and manipulating the truth in the interest
of its powerful masters. Alwavs reason is
motivated by affective needs: it exists to do
their bidding; directly or indirectly it works
to procure their satisfactions. . . . Even the
most logical and realistic thought is deter
mined by personal and primitive desire.i^
Against such a contention, Xiebuhr
would probably say that such an abuse
of reason was a derivative of an exag
gerated trust of reason, not balanced
by a proper consideration of the role
of the emotions, nor accompanied by a
proper discipline of the impulsive side
of nature. His criticism would again
take the form of an indictment of the
overly-intellectual emphasis in educa
tion, and of its failure to properly
estimate the organic unity of man's
]iersonality�the inler-relatedness of
his intellectual and appetitive powers.
Enough has been said to indicate
that the Crisis Theology, in its anthro-
l)ology, eliallenges modern educational
theory at (especially) two points: (1)
it contends that there has been lost the
transcendental frame of reference
within which alone a proper individ
ualism may be conserved in harmony
with the re(iuirenients of a democi atic
society; and (2) it contends that its
intellectualism has lost siiiht of the
organic character of human personal
ity, and hence has failed to cultivate
reason for her proper function.
III.
The emphasis of the Dialectical Tho-
ology upon such factors as crisis and
judf/ment comes as a wholesome cor
rective to the easy optimism which has
underlain much of the educational
theory of todav.^^ The ethical views of
Niebuhr and Brunner deserve some
more detailed analysis in an article of
this type, inasmuch as they involve a
type of world-outlook which has a con
siderable degree of plausibility in
times like these.
Brunner's ethical theory centers in
his view of the "Orders" and of the
"Imperative," between which this Avrit-
er divides the field of human endeavor.
In the Orders, Brunner finds both a
divine institution and a human fitness
for living within their mandates. They
are given to the individual, they make
life livable to him, and it is his duty
to either affirm them or to contribute
to their modification by actively infus
ing them with Christian principles.^^
These Orders represent the will of
God in a secondary and imperfect
form, and are five in number:
1. The family
2. The economic system
3. The state
4. The cultural pattern
5. The Church.
^Membership in the Orders affords an
opportunity for the expression of the
'life of love': in those instances in
which there is a discrepancy between
the actual society and the ideal of
Christian society,
. . . the individual is justified in acting upon
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his personal calling by the fact that God has
called, and that He will overrule finite mis-
judgments and pardon errors committed in
the face of the paradoxical situations com
monly called 'conflicting duties.'
Brunner 's view of the Imperative
represents a criticism of both natural
istic and rationalistic ethics, and
points to another and transcendental
source for ethics � that is, God as
moral revealer.^^ Such an ethic may
be expected to conflict at times with
man's 'natural' desires, and with his
reason as well. Hence, it addresses it
self to man's faith.
The fidelistic character of Brunner's
ethics is modified somewhat in the
moral philosophy of Reinhold Xiebuhr.
Unlike Brunner, he insists that the
law of love is relevant to social prob
lems on a wider scale than the mere
person-to-person and face-to-face level.
Xiebuhr sees the "natural man" as ob
ligated to "emulate the love of God,
to forgive as God forgives, to love his
enemies as God loves them.''^^ Thus
the 'love ideal', while impossible of
full realization under existing: condi
tions of human society, is still relevant
to the whole of human life: the pur
suit of this ideal does raise the general
level of human life.
Although this view is criticized from
some quarters as either a contempla
tion of a beautiful ideal, or as a justi
fication for the existence of the mar
gin between the real and the ideal,
it is not without its point. It serves,
first of all, to call attention to the tre
mendous complexity of the human so
cial problem, and the inadeauacv of
mere "social intelligence" as an anti
dote to our evils. A derivative of this
is the realization that an industrial
ized society, with absentee ownership,
and remote control of the processes of
production, generate social problems
incapable of ready solution.^^
This challenges education to an eth
ical approach which renders ethical
relativities as non-ultimate. It insists
upon fixed principles in ethics, as
given by a transcendental Lawgiver, in
relation to which precepts must be de
termined, often times, upon something
analogous to the Catholic view of a
hierarchy of values.
Closely allied with this is the insist
ence by the crisis theologians upon an
interpretation of man's ethical nature
in terms of its blackness. Instead of
acquiescing in the view that man's
character is merely gray in spots, these
thinkers insist that sin has reached
the center of the human personality,
and has produced reverberations in his
moral life which call for something
more than a mere e-diico, a calling-
forth of self-expression. Practically,
this involves a challenge to a redefini
tion of the aims of education, in terms
of a Christo-centric basis for moral in
struction. This issues in a renewed
call for emphasis upon content, instead
of mere method.^^
Related to this is the criticism of
fered by the thinkers under study
against modern education's attempt to
locate the heart of the Christian mes
sage in its ethical emphasis. In other
words. Christians are not made by a
facile imitatio Christi, conceived in
terms of a general criterion for the re
construction of the life of the group.
Christian ethical living is rather, say
the theologians of the Crisis school,
the fruition of the "encounter" of the
individual with his God.^^
This brings the consideration of the
challenge of the system under study to
modern education back to the question
mentioned earlier, namely that of the
status of the individual in a sound
philosophy of education. If the locus
of the moral problem be the individual,
then education is on the wrong track
in its stress upon mere methodology
conceived in terms of "socially useful
projects." Instead of elaborate com
mittee discussion and ideological pro
grams, (which have come into disre
pute since the Munich Pact), these
thinkers insist that the realities of the
situation require a vigorous applica
tion of the sanctions flowing from the
Orders. While this distrust of the
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value of reasoned exploration of man's
ethical ills (which is a form of educa
tion) may go too far, it serves at any
rate to underscore the whole protest
of the dialectical theologians against
a bland acceptance of the Socratic dic
tum in the moral instruction of man.
It serves to show the denth of the
moral problem, and seeks to emphasize
the necessity of a radical (and reli
gious) cure for man's moral obliquity.
* � *
From the foregoing considerations,
it seems clear that the Theology of
Crisis serves as an irritant to contem
porary educational theory. To func
tion thus, it does not necessarily offer
an adequate alternative: in point of
fact, it seems to the writer to fail to
do so. As a corrective, it challenges
certain bland presuppositions which
modern educational philosophy has
held, in the spirit of optimism which
characterized the 'twenties', a rosy
view of man long after the realities of
the world scene ceased to justify such
optimism.
However nebulous some of the solu
tions of these thinkers may seem, the
thinkers themselves have been pene
trating in their analysis of our most
pressing ills, and have fearlessly ap
plied canons of criticism which ren
dered them unpopular in the extreme.
One element in this challenge seems to
tower above the rest: the charge that
in all of the modern emphasis upon
the 'worth of the individual', that true
individuality (as distinguished from
mere particularity) is in constant peril
of being lost. As an antidote to this,
the crisis theologians insist upon the
theistic postulate as an essential frame
of reference within which the sell mav
be preserved. The God-reference be
comes not only the cornerstone of a
true metaphysics; it as well the neces
sary fixed star, in line with which a
true anthropology and a valid ethical
theoy can be maintained.
There are indications that this pro
test has not gone unheeded. While
such thinkers as Harrison S. Elliott
have protested the proposed solutions
of Brunner and Niebuhr. thev vet rec
ognize the validity of the criticisms
which these men have levelled against
m o d e r n educational philosophy.^'*
Again, the appearance of a book en
titled Chrht and Chrhiian Education
(instead of religious education) by an
author who would probably have
scoffed at his present title twenty
years ago, indicates that the protest is
not being wasted.
Thus, the system is a disturber of a
false peace; its voice comes to us re
inforced by the realities of the time,
and calls us to an education "that hath
foundations," and summons us to re
think onr world-view, in terms of the
statement that "its builder and maker
is God."
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